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ABSTRACT 
The Effects of a Commons Simulation and Fines on a 
Generalization Test 
by 
William Boyle, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1984 
Major Professor: Dr. Richard . B. Powers 
Department: Psychology 
The present study investigated the effect of a commons 
simulation and fines on a generalization test that incorporated 
several features important in the real world. Two hundred and 
seventy-five volunteer college students in groups of seven 
participated in this study. Approximately one-half received exposure 
to the commons simulation and one-half did not. One-half of the 
groups in each treatment level received two posttests with a fine 
option available and the other one-half received two posttests 
without this option. The two posttests differed in that one was 
played with a large unknown referent group and the other was played 
with the immediate group of seven. The results showed that some 
generalization from the commons simulation to the large posttest does 
occur. However, subjects in the large group do not cooperate (act in 
the common group interest) more or defect (act in the individual 
interest) less, but become more cautious as a result of the 
simulation exposure and withdraw from the commons when playing with a 
large and unknown referent group. (97 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, considerable attention has been devoted to 
the study of laboratory commons dilemmas (Dawes, 1980). Though 
several variables have been found which increase cooperation in these 
simulations, there are several shortcomings with this research. For 
example, McTavish (1977) pointed out in her critical review of the 
literature that behavior learned in a simulation does not generalize 
to real world referents. The few attempts to demonstrate the 
generality of laboratory findings to external settings have relied 
upon questionnaire and other self-report data. Though some 
correspondence may be found between cooperative behavior in the 
simulation environment and self-report measures, it is not clear 
whether subjects would do as they say they would in the face of real 
world dilemmas. Consequently, the measurement of the effects of 
laboratory simulations are dubious at best and have provided little 
evidence that players will behave responsibly (cooperatively) in the 
face of real world dilemmas. Thus, one purpose of the present study 
was to test the effects of playing a repeated trials Commons Dilemma 
Game (Powers, Duus, & Norton, 1980b) by measuring what players will 
do in a test that is different from the simulation setting. 
A further major purpose of the present study was to determine 
if a variable effective in the laboratory setting, i.e., fines, will 
generalize to another setting in which the group is large and 
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unknown, thus, assessing the effectiveness and validity of this 
variable. Fines have been examined in the laboratory setting and 
have been found to be effective in producing cooperation and 
preventing defection or exploitation in the commons simulation itself 
(Powers et al., 1980b). In almost all the studies examining the 
effect of fines on behavior, fines have been found to reduce resource 
exploitation or increase cooperation within the simulation exercise. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter will review the literature related to the commons 
dilemma problem. Specifically, this review will define the commons 
problem; review the suggestions made by researchers for engaging in 
useful research in this area; present a reinforcement analysis of 
commons dilemmas; and review the relevant research using commons 
simulations to investigate variables sufficient to allevi ate these 
simulated commons problems. 
Defining the Commons 
The major impetus for research investigating commons dilemmas, 
such as pollution and resource depletion, was Garrett Hardin's 
article, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968). In .this article he 
defined a commons as a resource that belongs to no one in particular 
but is accessible to everyone to use. The tragedy of the commons is 
illustrated in this manner: Assume that there is a township that has 
a pasture to graze cattle that is available for use b y all the 
ranchers. If the ranchers use the resource within its carr y ing 
capacity, the resource will be productive and yield high quality 
cattle to all the ranchers who use the pasture. The problem of the 
commons begins when at least one rancher decides to increase personal 
gain by adding more cattle to the pasture. The action of adding 
additional cattle encourages other ranchers to do the same and soon 
the pasture becomes unable to optimally support the cattle. Further, 
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each rancher enters a position in which he can cut his losses by 
adding more cattle, while the other ranchers share the loss equally 
in proportion to the amount of cattle each has grazing in the 
pasture. Thus, the pasture is inevitably destroyed. 
Defining a Course for Research 
The main conclusion of Hardin's work has been to refocus 
solutions to commons dilemma pro bl ems. Traditionally, scientists 
have focused on technological solutions to mankind's rapid depletion 
of some of the world's resources-- they have said that we will 
develop the scientific machinery necessary to solve the problem of 
resource overuse and depletion. For example, it has been said that 
science will develop the means to mine or drill deeper into the earth 
to extract precious minerals that are in short supply, or science 
will develop better methods of agriculture for arid climates to feed 
the malnourished people of the world. Hardin argued that these 
solutions are not pending, that these are a class of problems to 
which no long range technological solutions are possible. Hardin 
went on to suggest that we must find other solutions to the problem, 
namely political solutions. 
Crowe (1969) agrees with the seriousness of the commons problem 
but questions the usefulness of a political solution. Political 
solutions rest upon three assumptions: 1) that a weighing system can 
be developed that will equate incommensurables; 2) that a useful 
system of mutual coercion can be developed that will provide the 
greatest good for the greatest number; and 3) that an administrative 
system can be developed to prevent destruction of the commons. Crowe 
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argued that science can be helpful. Both the natural and the social 
sciences can be useful in alleviating commons problems by rewarding 
those people who no longer exploit the commons and by monitoring the 
commons and providing educational information for " . • corrective 
feedback .•. " (p. 1107). 
In an attempt to develop a focal point for research, Boniecki 
(1977) suggested that scientists answer the question, "Is man 
interested in his future?" (p. 59). By answering this question, 
Boniecki thinks personkind will then act in ways that are helpful to 
preserve humanity. In his article, Boniecki proposed an 
international research program that will attempt to bring about 
solutions to resource depletion and overuse problems and stresses 
that this program should focus on the developed world. The goal is 
to change the wasteful style of life of the developed countries. 
Stern (1978), in response to Boniecki's article, proposed that 
researchers study the behavior of people in a commons across all 
cultures and societies. Specifically, researchers should examine 
within each society " . • the conditions under which people manage 
the resource wisely, with the focusing primarily on attitudes about 
the future" (p. 156). He proposed three directions for this 
research: 1) researchers need to identify the values that are 
consistent with " ... maintenance of commons resources for the 
future" (p. 156); 2) researchers must identify the groups and 
institutions that have or will maintain commons resources; 3) 
researchers need to learn more about the mechanisms useful in 
establishing institutions which will increase our awareness of the 
future. 
A Reinforcement Analysis 
of Commons Dilemmas 
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Platt (1973) presented a reinforcement analysis of commons 
dilemmas and defined them as social traps. A social trap is: " ... 
a situation in society •.. where members or organizations or whole 
societies get themselves started in some direction or some set of 
relationships that later prove to be unpleasant or lethal and that 
they see no easy way out of or to avoid" (p. 641). Flatt's 
behavioral analysis of commons dilemmas uses Skinner's three-term 
formulation of stimulus-behavior-reinforcement. That is, some 
salient aspect of the environment (stimulus) impinges upon an 
organism causing a response (behavior) which is then followed by a 
consequence (reinforcer or punisher). The notion of a trap also 
includes a time component and dual consequences, short-term and long-
term consequences for a behavior. Thus, a trap occurs when in the 
presence of a stimulus, an organisn emits a behavior that generates 
highly reinforcing immediate consequences and punishing delayed 
consequences. Because of the immediacy of the short range 
consequence, the behavior is reinforced immediately after occurring, 
while its punishing aspects occur after a period of time in which 
many other behaviors may have intervened. A good example of a trap 
is whaling in the 20th century. Initially, whalers hunted a few 
whales. However, as whaling became quite profitable, whalers began 
to hunt more and more whales without regard for the large number that 
were being killed. More money was put into more modern equipment to 
maintain or increase whale catches as the resource began to dwindle. 
Now, with the resource at Vf!ry low levels many countries have faced 
the reality that whaling has become unprofitable because the resource 
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is near exhaustion. However, several countries have not yet accepted 
this fact and will at sometime in the near future have to face the 
reality that whaling will no longer be profitable either because 
resources are too low or all the whales have been killed. 
Characteristics of a Commons Simulation 
Several games have been developed by researchers to investigate 
behavior in a commons dilemma. The Nuts Game was developed by Edney 
(1979) and allows subjects to pick bolt type nuts which are equated 
with a resource (like money or class points) from a bowl. Dawes 
(1973) presents another commons dilemma simulation which is a 
multiple trial game in which individual subjects can make one of two 
choices: to defect (individualistic, selfish play) or cooperate 
(cooperative, group oriented play). Another game was developed by 
Powers, Duus, and Norton (1980b) which allows subjects to make one of 
five choices on each trial of a multiple trial game. Subjects in a 
group can cooperate, defect, withdraw (play for low salary that 
affects no other players), help cooperators (add points to 
cooperative players scores), or fine (impose a fine on defectors) 
defectors. In all these games the experimenter is free to vary a 
number of independent variables, for example, communication, 
information, resource replenishment, resource value, and size of 
groups. The last game presented by Powers et al. (1980b) also allows 
the experimenter to manipulate the availability of specific choices, 
the values of individual choices, and the effect of the choices in 
relation to each other. These game properties allow the experimenter 
to examine more of the variables that might be helpful in solving 
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commons problems in the real world. 
In his article, Stern (1978) outlined several features that he 
considered necessary for a commons simulation. One, individuals 
should be able to make choices that are independent of the immediate 
effects of the other players in the simulation. Two, the simulation 
should allow for intragroup dynamics, specifically, players should be 
allowed to communicate among each other. Three, the simulation 
resource should be dynamic, that is, the state of the resource should 
be subject to change as a function of player choices. If individuals 
attempt to take too much of the resource, the resource should deplete 
with the consequence of less, or zero, resource for subsequent play. 
Four, a simulation should allow for the play of inter-group actions, 
that is, the play for other agencies to affect group outcomes. 
Relevant Research 
Many reviews of the literature have been written that directly 
relate to the commons problem. Often these reviews deal extensively 
with conservation and consumption behavior, commons dilemmas, and 
multiple-n prisoner dilemmas (Dawes, 1980; Edney, 1980; Edney & 
Harper, 1978b: Linder, 1982; Norton & Powers, 1981; Shippee, 1980). 
In general these reviews define the problem of the commons, elaborate 
on theoretical explanations, review methodological approaches of the 
study of commons dilemmas, expound upon variables sufficient to 
alleviate the commons problem, and propose directions for future 
research. The review of the research that follows will outline the 
important research in the area of commons simulations, present the 
results of these studies, and summarize the findings to date. 
Stern (1976) in a carpooling simulation assigned subjects in 
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groups of four to one of the cells of a 2 X 2 X 3 factorial design. 
One independent variable manipulated was gasoline prices or gas 
rationing coupons. Another independent variable was the amount of 
information available about rationing and pricing changes that 
occurred during the game. Subjects were told that rationing or 
pricing would change with time without further explanation or were 
given further information about the changes and when they would 
occur. The final independent variable was the degree of information 
about the commons. Subjects were given either a) no information, b) 
an effective strategy that would reduce costs for the driver, or c) 
messages every 3 minutes reminding subjects of the long range 
consequences of their behavior. In the simulation, subjects made one 
of three choices: to drive alone, to drive in a carpool, or to ride 
in the carpool. The dependent measure was the amount of carpooling 
done by the subjects. The results showed that increasing prices was 
more effective in maintaining the resource than rationing. Also, 
detailed information about pricing and rationing schedules influenced 
people to car pool more often. An analysis of sex differences 
produced no significant finding. 
Brechner (1977) investigated the effects of communication and 
resource size on resource management. Subjects in groups of three 
were assigned to one of the cells of a 2 X 2 factorial design. The 
two levels of communication were open communication in which subjects 
could communicate freely and no communication. Resource size 
included one resource being twice as large as the other. Subjects 
responded on an fixed ratio 10 schedule of reinforcement for a point. 
Subjects also had to wait 6, 12, 18, or 24 seconds before they could 
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respond for an additional point (differential reinforcement of low 
rates of responding schedule of reinforcement). Subjects had to wait 
at the longer intervals if the resource was more depleted. The 
resource pool replenished itself every 2, 4, 6, or 8 seconds 
depending upon the level of resource remaining. The pool doubled in 
size at replenishment time with the maximum number of points equal to 
the number available at the beginning of the game. The dependent 
measure in this experiment was the number of points returned to the 
resource pool. The results showed a significant effect for both pool 
size and communication. Subjects in the larger pool size and the 
communication groups returned more points to the resource. 
Edney and Harper (1978c) exposed college students to a commons 
dilemma simulation in which they could earn points for credit. 
Subjects in groups of three were assigned to one of four groups: 
simulation only; simulation plus information about trap 
characteristics; simulation plus a strategy for avoiding traps and 
earning a large number of points; and simulation plus verbal 
communication at any time. Subjects played 12 rounds of the game and 
could earn zero to three points on a given round. The resource 
started with 15 points and was doubled at the end of each round but 
was restricted to a maximum of 15 points at any given time. Five 
dependent variables were used: 1) the number of games in which traps 
were avoided; 2) the number of points obtained per group; 3) the 
number of rounds played before the resource was exhausted; 4) the 
number of points returned to the resource; and 5) the range of points 
earned by individuals in ~ach group. The results of this study 
showed that the free communication group did significantly better 
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than the other groups on all measures of resource maintenance. In 
addition, the information group did significantly better than both 
the simulation only and the strategy group on number of points 
obtained, rounds played, and pool replenishments. 
In yet another study, Edney and Harper (1978a) investigated the 
effects of responsibility and communication in a commons simulation 
in a 2 X 2 factorial design. The two levels of responsibility were 
the presence or absence of a volunteer leader. The two levels of 
communication were no communication and communication at any time. 
In groups of three, subjects were exposed to a commons simulation in 
which they could earn 0, 1, 2, or 3 points on a given trial as long 
as the resource contained points. In addition, subjects could choose 
to double the resource by holding up an 'X' card and skipping two 
trials. The pool limit was 15 points and automatically doubled every 
two trials. The five dependent variables were: number of 'X' cards 
played, total points earned, number of trials played, and the number 
of points replenished. The results showed that on all dependent 
measures the communication group did significantly better than the no 
communication group. Leadership produced no significant results 
though leaders themselves played more 'X' cards than nonleaders. 
Shippee (1978) investigated the effects of leadership and group 
participation on resource management in a simulated commons dilemma. 
The three levels of leadership were no leader, a leader randomly 
chosen by the experimenter, or a group elected leader. The three 
levels of participation were individual, majority, or unanimous 
ability to restrict the resource, that is, in the individual 
condition one person could control access to the resource; in the 
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majority condition, a majority of subjects could agree to restrict 
the resource; and in the unanimous condition all subjects had to 
agree to restrict the resource. A "trailing control group", that 
received none of the experimental conditions, was included as part of 
the study. Subjects were exposed to a commons simulation in which 
they removed nuts from a bowl (equated with class points) one at a 
time. The resource was doubled every 15 seconds and never exceeded 
its starting size. The dependent measures were duration of resource, 
number of units replenished, amount of resource accumulated, rate of 
resource removal, and the proportion of groups in each condition that 
depleted the resource. A second set of dependent measures were 
gathered to assess the processes used by the group. In general, the 
results of this study showed that elected leadership, when combined 
with high participation, produced significantly better resource 
management than the other experimental groups and the control group. 
In another study, Talarowski (1977) researched the effect of 
moralizing and positive incentives in a decomposed commons game. The 
game was decomposed in that the amount cooperators and defectors 
earned was less on some subsequent trials. The two levels of 
incentive used were high incentive in which defectors always earned 
$8.00 more than cooperators and low incentive in which defectors 
earned only $5.00 more than cooperators. The two levels of 
moralizing were information about the mechanics of the game and 
information plus an explanation of the benefits and the risks of the 
game ( moralizing). The dependent measures were the number of 
defections and the predicti o ns subjects made about defection. The 
results of this study showed a significant effect of both incentive 
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and moralizing. Specifically, the results indicate that groups given 
an explanation of the game benefits and risks defected much less 
than the other groups. Also, the groups with the smaller payoff 
differential between cooperators and defectors defected much less 
than the other groups. There was also a significant effect for 
decomposition between the trials. 
Kelley and Grzelak (1972) investigated the effect of 
manipulating the degree of individual and common interest. The two 
levels of individual interest were low and high differences between 
the payoff scores of cooperators and defectors on a given trial. The 
two levels of common interest were small and large increases in the 
payoff scores of both cooperators and defectors. That is, the scores 
of both cooperators and defectors were increased as the number of 
cooperators increased. In groups of five, subjects played four 
multiple trial games, one in each condition. On a given trial, 
subjects made one of two choices, to cooperate or to defect. The 
dependent measure was the number of cooperative responses made by 
each group for the first 10 trials and the last 10 trials. Subjects 
were also given a questionnaire to access their perceptions about the 
game. A comparison of the first 10 trials with the last 10 trials 
within each group showed that the high individual interest groups 
(high disparity in amount of resource earned between cooperators and 
defectors) declined significantly in the number of cooperative 
choices made while cooperative choices rose in the low individual 
interest group. An analysis of a questionnaire showed that the 
cooperative subjects appeared to be more aware of their ability to 
control the game. 
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Cass (1975) examined the effects of information and 
territoriality on the play of subjects in a simulated commons dilemma 
composed of four person groups. Subjects in the information 
condition were either given information about the status of the 
resource at any time or given no information. Subjects in the 
territoriality condition were assigned to three of 12 resource 
territories from which they could draw points while subjects in the 
other condition could draw points from any of the 12 resource 
territories. Subjects could draw points at any time from the 
resource. Each territory of the resource started with 4 points and 
was replenished by doubling to a maximum of 4 points every 3 minutes. 
When a given territory was exhausted (reached zero) it was not 
replenished. The game was played until all points (territories) were 
exhausted or until the fifth replenishment. Subjects were also 
administered a questionnaire after the exercise which attempted to 
assess subject beliefs, thoughts, and attitudes about the game. The 
three dependent measures used to assess the game were points 
remaining in the pool, total number of points replenished to the 
pool, and total number of points obtained from the pool. The results 
of this study indicated that there were significant results for both 
territoriality and information across all of the dependent 
variables. The groups given information and assigned to individual 
territories did significantly better at managing the commons 
resource. 
Rubenstein, Watze, Doktor, and Dana (1975) studied the effect of 
two incentive schemes on behavior in a commons dilemma game. The 
two types of incentive were individuals keeping the points they 
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earned or individuals sharing their points equally with the other 
members of the group. Another variable studied was the state of the 
resource at the beginning of the game, either full or half full. 
High school students in groups of five were exposed to a commons 
simulation card game. Subjects were dealt seven cards from a deck 
initially containing either half blue cards or all blue cards. If a 
player was dealt 5 blue cards, the player earned points. However, 
one of the blue cards a player was dealt was converted to red for the 
next trial. The player could circumvent this process by paying to 
stop the change or paying twice as much to add a blue card to the 
deck for the next round. The dependent measure was the amount of 
points spent by the group to maintain the resource. The results 
showed that groups beginning with the all blue card groups spent 
significantly less points to maintain the resource. Also, groups in 
the condition that shared points spent more points to maintain the 
resource. 
In their research, Jerdee and Rosen (1974) examined the effects 
of communication and the visibilit y of play in another simulated 
commons dilemma. The two levels of communication were low 
communication in which subjects were not allowed to communicate and 
high communication in which subjects could conference after each 
trial. Subjects in the low visibility groups could only see their 
own play on each trial while subjects in the high visibility 
condition could see every player's play. In the game, subjects made 
bids for a company with the goal of making a profit for the company. 
One kind of bid emphasized maximum profit to the company at the 
expense of the rest of the industry. The other kind of bid produced 
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less profit for the company and was good for the industry as a whole. 
Ten trials were played but only the last five were analyzed. The 
dependent variable was the number of each kind of bid made by the 
groups. The results of this study showed that groups allowed to 
communicate made twice as many bids that were good for the industry 
as a whole than the no communication groups. There was no effect for 
visibility. 
In a study that examined the generality of a commons dilemma 
game, Powers and Boyle (1983) exposed subjects to a 2 X 2 X 2 design 
that investigated communication, information, and fines. Subjects in 
the no communication group were not allowed to conference; those in 
the communication group were allowed to hav~ conferences every five 
trials after the 25th trial if a majority of players voted to do so. 
There were also two levels of fines: in one group players did not 
have the option to fine defectors while in the other condition 
players could fine defectors. The two levels of information were 
full information in which subjects were given a real world analogy 
relating fish and points and were told that defection would deplete 
the resource. The no information group was given no information 
about the game beyond the mechanics of play. All players played 50-
75 trials of the commons dilemma game and could make one of five 
choices: cooperate, defect, withdraw, help cooperators, or fine 
defectors. After the subjects played the commons simulation, they 
were given a test with either three or four choices. The fine group 
had the fine option available, the no fine group did not. Posttests 
allowed subjects an opportunity to earn a large number of points on 
one trial. The results of this study showed that subjects in the 
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fine and information conditions defected significantly less than the 
other groups on the generalization test. Within the no fine group, 
those groups allowed to communicate showed significantly more 
cooperation than the groups not allowed to communicate. Data were 
analyzed for differences in the group size (no statistics reported) 
but none were found. 
In their study, Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) used a 2 X 4 
factorial design to investigate the effects of four levels of 
communication and losing or not losing money in a simulated commons 
dilemma. The four levels of communication were: 1) discussion of the 
commons before the play of each trial; 2) discussion prior to each 
play plus a non-binding vote prior to each trial; 3) social 
communication with no discussion about the game; and 4) no 
communication plus a work task unrelated to the game. The loss group 
was given knowledge that they could lose money while playing this 
game while the no loss group was assured that they would not lose 
money playing this game. On each trial subjects could choose to 
cooperate or to defect. Cooperators received $2.50 minus $1.50 for 
each person who defected. Defectors received $12.00 minus $1.50 for 
each person who defected. Subjects played in groups of five to eight 
people. The dependent measures used were the amount of defection 
and subjects' predictions of the play of others. The results showed 
that the subjects in the commons discussion group defected 
significantly less than the no communication and the irrelevant 
communication groups. There were no differences as a function of the 
possibility of losing money playing the game. Other results of this 
study indicated that people in the no communication condition and 
18 
people who defect predict significantly more defection. Also, groups 
which could communicate were better predictors of the play of others. 
Data were also analyzed for sex and group size but differences were 
not statistically significant. 
Powers, Duus, and Norton (1980a) examined the effects of 
communication and player imposed fines and rewards. At various 
points in a commons game, subjects were allowed to communicate during 
conferences available every 5 trials. In addition, the choices the 
subjects could make varied during the game. An altruistic choice 
(giving cooperative players points) and a policing choice (allowing 
subjects to fine defectors) were introduced at different times in the 
game. The dependent variable was the frequency the groups played 
each of the choices available in the game. The results were not 
statistically analyzed but the following trends were reported. When 
subjects could choose a withdrawal response or fine defectors, 
defect -ion decreased. In several of the communication groups, the 
introduction of communication decreased defection. In a 
generalization test presented after the game, the level of 
cooperation increased as a function of the number of times the 
individual had played the game. 
Powers, Duus, and Norton (1979) have summarized the play of 
subjects exposed to the Commons Game. While playing this game 
subjects as a general rule opted for defection. When a withdrawal or 
a policing response was introduced to the game, more cooperation and 
less defection occurred even though the withdrawal and policing 
responses were not played ~ery much. 
In another study, Smith, Powers, and Boyle (1984) examined the 
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effects of group size (six vs eighteen) on the choices of players in 
the Commons Dilemma Game. Subjects could chose one of five colors 
indicating choices to cooperate, defect, withdraw, help cooperators, 
or fine defectors over a series of fifty trials. The dependent 
variables were the percentage of color choices each group made for 
the first 25 trials versus the last 25 trials. The results of the 
study showed that groups of six players defected significantly more 
than the groups of 18 players. The reason for this is not known and 
is currently being investigated. In addition, both sized groups 
improved in their play from the first 25 trials to the last 25 
trials. Specifically, the groups cooperated more, defected less, 
fined defectors less, and helped cooperators more in the last 25 
trials. 
Naturalistic Studies 
In a naturalistic study, Acheson (1975) examined the effect of 
territoriality on lobster beds off the coast of Maine. He examined 
two kinds of lobster territories: "nucleated" and "perimeter 
defende~' territories. These two kinds of territories differ in the 
degree to which exclusively maintained fishing rights are maintained 
through local (not legal) custom. Perimeter defended areas are 
territories which lie close to the harbors from which the lobstermen 
operate and which through custom have strict boundaries for 
individual use. Nucleated areas lie farther from the harbors and 
have no precisely defined areas of ownership, all lobstermen from 
different areas may fish with impunity. Data were obtained over 
three seasons on several dependent measures: catch per unit of 
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effort, number of lobsters caught, lobster caught per trap, pounds of 
lobster per trap, price per lobster, and fisherman income. The 
results of this descriptive analysis indicated that fisherman in the 
nucleated areas showed many of the problems of an overused commons 
resource, that is, on all the dependent measures fisherman in 
nucleated areas had poorer outcomes than the fisherman from perimeter 
defended a re as. 
McHugh (1977) analyzed the history of whaling and illustrated 
the tragedy of the commons by outlining the decline of the world's 
whale stocks through unrestricted killing of whales. In the 20th 
century, the amount of whale oil harvested was at an all time high, 
whaling fleets were at their largest, and 18 countries were whaling. 
As whale stocks declined noticeably in size, companies developed more 
technological means to catch whales--i.e. sonar, helicopters, factory 
ships, etc. As whale stocks declined to severely low levels, whaling 
companies attempted to set quotas, but often they could not agree. 
Each company wanted a larger part of any quota. As stocks 
depreciated even more, countries began to set quotas for specific 
whales and oceans and in 1946 the International Whaling Commission 
was formed. The International Whaling Commission has not been very 
effective and was neutralized by countries walking out in 
disagreement with lower quotas. Additionally, it often set quotas 
that were too high. It was not until the mid 1960's that more 
reasonable quotas were established that allowed some whale stocks to 
begin recuperating. Today, although many countries have realized 
the importance of the resource and have banned whaling altogether 
some countries continue to hunt with Japan and the USSR consuming 85% 
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of the world's catch. 
Research Summary 
In summary, the results of previous studies have shown that many 
variables are effective in controlling resource depletion and the 
behavior of subjects within laboratory commons simulations. 
Variables that have been effective are communication, information, 
responsibility, group participation, possibility of losing money, 
resource size, and fines. In general, these variables were effective 
in remediating a simulated resource depletion problem. 
Communication within the simulation setting has been the most 
examined variable that has proved effective in controlling commons 
problems. Several forms of comm uni cation within a variety of 
experimental analogs have been effective. A few studies have allowed 
communication at any time or before each trial of the simulation 
(Brechner, 1977; Dawes et al., 1977; Edney & Harper, 1978a, 1978c; 
Jerdee & Rosen, 1974). Other studies have controlled the amount of 
communication so that it is available every 5 trials (Powers et al., 
1980a) and only if a majority of subjects voted to communicate 
(Powers & Boyle, 1983; Smith et al., 1984). In all studies in which 
communication was allowed, subjects managed the resource better than 
subjects not allowed to communicate. 
Information is another variable that has been examined quite 
extensively in commons simulations. The research has indicated that 
the more specific the information subjects are given about the nature 
of the commons simulation, the more effective their strategies are in 
remedying the commons problem. Edney and Harper (1978c) showed that 
the more information subjects had about the trap characteristics of 
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a commons simulation, the better the groups managed the resource. 
They also showed that general strategy suggestions were ineffective. 
Powers and Boyle (1983) showed that information about the mechanics 
of the game alone was not effective in bringing about generalization 
to a posttest. Subjects had to be informed of how the changes will 
affect them, that is, what consequences will occur as a result of 
their play. Talarowski (1977) also found that information about the 
mechanics of a simulation is not enough to produce cooperation and 
eliminate defection; this information must be coupled with an 
explanation of the benefits and risks of the game. Cass (1975) found 
that feedback about the status of the resource enhanced cooperative 
play and replenishment of the commons resource. 
Other research has shown the effectiveness of random (Powers et 
al., 1980a) and player imposed fines (Powers & Boyle, 1983; Powers, 
et al., 1979) on controlling defection and cooperation in a commons 
simul .ation. Territoriality was effective in the sense that when 
subjects were assigned to specific portions of the resource to draw 
points from, the entire resource lasted much longer than when 
subjects are allowed to harvest from anywhere in the resource (Cass, 
1975). The same was true out in the real world when the catches of 
lobstermen who had personal territories were more than the catches of 
lobstermen in general use territories (Acheson, 1975). 
The remainder of the studies reviewed showed that larger 
resources last longer (Brechner, 1977; Dawes et al., 1977) that 
leadership had no effect except when combined with a high level of 
group participation in which decisions· about the commons are 
unanimous (Shippee, 1978); that higher payoffs for defection were 
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associated with more defection and less cooperation between members 
of the group (Kelley & Grzelak, 1972; Talarowski, 1977); that groups 
who shared earned points equally cooperated more and defected less 
than groups whose members retained points they had earned (Rubenstein 
et al., 1975); that open group play did not effect the level of 
cooperation or defection (Jerdee & Rosen, 1974); that males and 
females played commons simulations similarly (Dawes et al., 1977); 
and that group size had little effect (Dawes et al., 1977; Powers & 
Boyle, 1983) except when the group was large (18 players) (Smith et 
al., 1984). 
Whereas several studies (Cass, 1975; Kelley & Grzelak, 1972) 
have attempted to assess what subjects learn in simulation settings, 
the measures used have concerned themselves with subjective analysis 
of perceptions, awareness, and attitudes. Only one study to date, 
(P o wers & Boyle, 1983) has assessed behavioral changes. These 
researchers had subjects fill out posttests giving the subjects an 
opportunit y to earn a large amount of points in one trial. Again, 
their results showed that subjects given more information in the 
simulation setting and in the fine condition cooperated more and 
defected less than other subjects on the posttest. Within the no 
fine condition, subjects allowed to communicate during the simulation 
and prior to the filling out of the posttest cooperated more than 
those not allowed to communicate in this condition. The significance 
of this finding is that subjects learn something from the gaming 
simulation that generalizes to another setting, suggesting that 
perhaps what is learned in the simulation setting will generalize to 
the real world. One significant weakness of this study was the lack 
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of a control group that received no simulation. It is possible that 
some of these results could have been produced in a group that was 
not exposed to the simulation. 
In summary, many studies have been reviewed and the variables 
effective in the simulation study have been outlined. Only one study 
to date, Powers and Boyle (1983) has attempted to assess 
generalization of what is learned in the simulation setting to 
another setting comparable to the real world in that subjects played 
only once, for a large number of points, and with an unknown referent 
group. The major limitation of previous research has been that it 
has not attempted to assess the generality of simulation findings. 
The one study that did (Powers & Boyle, 1983) failed to control for 
the effect of the game itself. 
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CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The primary purpose of the present study was to determine 
whether behavior that occurred in a commons simulation also occurred 
on a one-trial posttest that was played with a large and unknown 
referent group and provided players with an opportunity to earn a 
large amount of points in a short period of time. Subjects had 
either prior experience with a commons dilemma game (game group) or 
were naive (no game group) prior to taking a posttest. The play of 
all the subjects on the large and the small group posttest was 
descriptively analysed. Posttest comparisons between conditions were 
made between the game and no game groups. In addition, the present 
study attempted to determine if a variable (fines) known to be 
effective in the simulation settin g would continue its effectiveness 
in the posttests. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
University students in three introductory Psychology courses 
were given a pretest during the first two weeks of the quarter. One 
form of the pretest required the subjects to make one of three 
choices: to cooperate, defect, or withdraw. The other form had four 
choices: to cooperate, defect, withdraw, or fine defectors. If the 
subjects received the pretest with the three options, they were 
assigned to the no fine group and if the subjects received the 
pretest with the fine option, they were assigned to the fine group. 
During the second to ninth week of the quarter, groups of seven 
subjects, all from either the fine or no fine group, volunteered to 
participate in the study to earn extra points for their class grade. 
Subjects met in the Human Behavior Laboratory anq were randomly 
assigned to the game or no game group. 
Subjects in the game group received a commons simulation prior 
to the administration of two posttests. Subjects in the no game 
group received only the two posttests. All subjects were allowed to 
communicate with the members of their immediate group of seven prior 
to the filling out of each posttest. The large group post test was 
administered first, then the second small group posttest was 
administered. Subjects played the large group posttest with all the 
subjects in their condition for that quarter. Subjects played the 
small group posttest only with members in their immediate group of 
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seven. All subjects received posttests identical to their pretest. 
Procedure 
The basic design of this study was a 2 X 2 with fines versus no 
fines as one independent variable and game versus no game as the 
second independent variable (See Table 1 for a summary of the 
experimental design). 
Pretest. During the second week of the quarter, all students in 
Dr. Powers Psychology 101 class were given a copy of the pretest to 
fill out. After the students made one of the choices, the tests 
were gathered and the students were assigned to either the fine or no 
fine condition. A list was made for each condition and posted for 
students to know which group they were in. Subjects not in 
attendance that day were given a chance to fill out the pretest at a 
later time. 
Approximately one-half of the class received · a pretest with the 
fine option and one-half of the class received the pretest without 
this option. Assignment was random in that the students sitting on 
one side of the room were given the pretest with the fine option and 
the students sitting on the other side of the room were given the 
pretest without the fine option. 
Subjects. As subjects, 275 volunteer Psychology 101 students 
were used from three classes scheduled for fall, winter, and spring 
of Utah State University's 1982-1983 academic school year. During 
the second to ninth week of each quarter, the subjects participated 
in the experiment. Subjects volunteered at the end of each day's 
class to play the Commons Dilemma Game for class points (points 
Table 1 
Experimental Design 
Group Fines Game 
X 
0 
X 
0 
N 
70 
67 
75 
63 
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Note. The above table indicates whether the subjects received a 
posttest with the fine (X) or without the fine (0) option available 
and received the treatment (X) or no treatment (O) condition. All 
subjects received an identical pretest and two posttests. 
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earned in the game could make up to 10% of a student's class grade). 
Seven were accepted as subjects if they had not played the commons 
game, or participated as control subjects, and all seven belonged to 
either the fine or the no fine condition. The subjects were randomly 
assigned to the game or no game condition when they arrived at the 
Human Behavior lab. A list of randomly determined (coin toss) game 
or no game groups had been made at the beginning of each quarter and 
was used to assign groups to the game or no game condition. 
Game. If the group was assigned to the game condition, the 
standardized instructions for the game were given and the commons 
game was played. Subjects in the game condition were given 5 
colored cards: red, green, yellow, orange, and black as well as 
shields to conceal individual play of cards from the rest of the 
group. Subjects also received a record sheet on which they recorded 
their individual play (which was not to be seen by other players) and 
the number of points they earned on each trial of the game. Two 
experimenters were present each day to run the commons simulation, to 
record the group play on each trial, and to administer the posttests. 
As part of the simulation, in the front of the room on another 
table a flipchart matrix and a pegboard were displayed. The 
flipchart matrix contained 17 matrices which determined the point 
values for the play of cooperative (red) and defection responses 
(green). The matrix was read by counting the number of red choices 
made by the individuals in the group. Table 2 shows one of the 17 
matrices, the starting (zero) matrix for the Commons Game. An 
example of how to read the matrix follows: Suppose that on a trial 
the group plays 2 red cards and 5 green cards. The subjects who 
Table 2 
Zero Matrix for the Commons Dilemma Game 
PLAY PAY 
Number of red Red Green 
Choices 
0 100 
1-2 40 102 
3 42 104 
4 44 106 
5 46 108 
6 48 110 
7 50 
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picked red would earn 40 points and subjects who played green would 
earn 102 points. The matrices reflect the status of the resource at 
any given time during the game. (See Appendix I for all the payoff 
matrices.) 
A pegboard resembling a cribbage board served as a counting 
device and provided visual feedback to the players about the state of 
the point resource (See Appendix II). The pegboard contained a 
series of 10 holes marked off at regular intervals with each interval 
corresponding to one of the payoff matrices. The peg on the pegboard 
moved up or down and when it moved into the adjacent bin of ten 
holes, the payoff matrix was changed. For every green choice made, 
the peg moved down one hole on the pegboard. For every 10 holes the 
peg moved down, the payoff matrix changed and the payoffs for both 
red and green got smaller. This decrease simulated the depletion of 
a resource when the individuals in a commons take too much from the 
resource. 
Periodically, on randomly chosen trials (variable trial 6.25), 
the peg was moved up a predetermined number of holes. The number of 
holes that the peg moved up was dependent upon the state of the 
resource, i.e., the matrix currently obtaining (See Table 3). This 
upward movement represented the replenishment of a biological 
resource through reproduction. If group play was predominantly red 
(cooperative), the payoff matrix gradually improved as the peg moved 
up the pegboard. 
Besides the play of red and green cards, the game subjects could 
play yellow, orange, or black. The yellow card paid a player a 
Table 3 
The Replenishment Rate for Each Matrix 
Matrix currently obtaining 
Replenishment rate 
(move up) 
0 
8 
±1-2 
7 
32 
±3-4 ±5-6 ±7-8 
6 5 4 
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low, fixed amount of points, (6 points) regardless of what the other 
players did. This option allowed players to withdraw from the 
commons when they did not fully trust the play of others and did not 
want to hurt others by defecting. In addition, it provided the group 
with some means to earn points when the resource was near an 
exhausted state. For example, in the -5 matrix, an all green play by 
the group would only earn each member 6 points. However, it would 
drive down the matrix considerably (7 holes on the pegboard). Since 
a yellow choice also earned 6 points and did not expend the 
resource, players could choose yellow when the matrix reached this 
level. 
The orange and black cards were provided to allow the players 
some opportunity to control the behavior or play of others. Both 
cards cost the player 10 points to play. The orange card added 10 
points to every player's score who played red. The black card 
negated any points that green earned for that trial and imposed an 
additional 20 point fine. For example, using the zero matri x of 
Table 1, if a play of 4 reds, 1 green, 1 orange, and 1 bla ck were 
made by the members of a group, red would earn 52 points (42 for 
red and 10 more points because an orange was played), green would 
lose 20 points, orange would lose 10 points, and black would lose 10 
points. The game consisted of at least 75 trials and lasted 
approximately 90 minutes. During the first 25 trials, players were 
not allowed to communicate with one another. During the next 50 
trials conferences were allowed every 5 trials for 2 minutes if a 
majority of the individuals voted to do so at each opportunity. The 
game was generally ended on the 75th trial if the subjects had 
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reached a solution that was not exploiting the commons, 
specifically, if members of the group were playing combinations of 
red, yellow, orange, and/or black for 15 consecutive trials or green 
was played by members of the group with group consent. 
Posttests. After the game was played (or as soon as subjects 
were seated in the no game condition), two posttests (generalization 
tests) were administered to all the subjects. The first posttest 
(large group) was played with all the people in that condition for 
that quarter. The second posttest (small group) administered was 
played only with the seven subjects in the laboratory. The posttests 
consisted of a sheet of paper on which subjects could make choices 
identical to those made in the pretest (see Appendix III). Again, 
subjects could chose to cooperate , defect, or withdraw if the y were 
in the no fine group or to cooperate, defect, withdraw, or fine a 
defector if they were in the fine group. To control for color 
preference that might occur during the game or from students talking 
to each other about the study across the quarter several forms of 
each test were available in which the names of numbers, geometric 
forms, or colors were associated with defection, cooperation, 
withdrawal, and/or fining. 
Finally, standardized instructions (prepared for each group) 
were paraphrased to all groups prior to the Commons Game and the 
administration of all posttests (See Appendix IV for all standardized 
instructions given prior to treatment and the administration of the 
posttests). The instructions prior to the game explained the use of 
the cards, matrix, pegboard, and the general mechanics of the game, 
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and provided a standardized reading of an analogue explanation on how 
the commons works. All groups (game and no game) received 
standardized instructions prior to the posttests which explained how 
to play the posttest, who the subjects were playing with, that they 
could talk among each other for 10 minutes, and that they should mark 
their posttest behind the shields provided so no one could see the 
choice they made. The standardized instructions for the large 
group posttest group were paraphrased, and the group filled out the 
posttest after communication. The small group posttest was then 
given with the standardized instructions for that group (same as 
large group posttest except that the referent group was the seven 
subjects in the room) and the posttest was then marked after an 
opportunity to communicate. 
All groups were allowed to leave after the administration of 
both posttests. 
Design Summary 
In summary, the basic design was a 2 X 2 design with fines and 
treatments as independent variables (see Table 3). The dependent 
variables were the choices on the posttest. Chi Square analyses were 
performed between: 1) the game and no game groups on the large 
posttest; 2) the game and no game groups on the small posttest; 3) 
the fine and no fine groups on the large posttest; 4) the fine and no 
fine groups on the small posttest. Further, Chi Square Tests for 
Independence were performed using changes in choice from the pretest 
to the posttest for both the independent variables. Finally, a 
descriptive analysis of the differences between the game-no game and 
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fine-no fine conditions given pretest choices were conducted. The 
data for five subjects who played the game twice were removed from 
the total N of 280, so posttest comparisons were based upon an N of 
275. Pre- posttest comparisons were based on an N of 270, since five 
subjects did not take the pretest. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Figure 1 shows the percent of individuals who chose red 
(cooperated), green (defected), yellow (withdrew), or black (fined 
defectors) on the large and the small referent group posttest. On 
the large referent group posttest, 64.7 % chose red, 10.5% green, 
22.9% yellow, and 1.8% black. On the small referent group posttest, 
84.0% played red, 14.9% green, .7% yellow, and .4% black. Analyses 
of the results were descriptive because no adequate statistical test 
can be applied to the data. The results show that there are some 
large differences in the choices of the subjects as a function of 
their making a choice in the large referent group or the small 
referent group. On the large referent group posttest, subjects 
played 19% less red (65% to 84%) and 22% more yellow (23% to 1%) than 
they did on the small referent group posttest. Graphs of these 
differences across the game-no game condition and the fine-no fine 
condition are presented in Figures 2 through 5. 
Figure 2 shows the choices of individuals across the game and 
the no game condition on the large referent group posttest. In the 
game condition, 51. 7% subjects played red, 9.0% green, 36.6% yellow, 
and 2.8% black. In the no game condition, 79.2% subjects played red, 
12.3% green, 7.7% yellow, and .8% black. A Chi Square Test for 
Independence indicated that there was a significant difference in the 
choices subjects made in the game and no game conditions on the large 
group posttest (X 2 = 33.59; df = 2; p < .01). Because of the low 
Figure 1. The percentage of subjects who played red, green, yellow, 
or black on the small and large group generalization test. (Numbers 
above bars are number of subjects.) 
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number of black choices made in the two conditions, black choices 
were eliminated from the Chi Square Analysis. Analysis of the 
contribution of each cell to the X' indicated that the primary 
differences in responding lay in the differences in which the two 
groups chose red and yellow. The subjects in the game condition 
withdrew more and cooperated less than subjects in the no game 
condition. 
Figure 3 presents the choices of individuals on the small 
referent group posttest across the game and the no game conditions. 
In the game condition, 82.1% chose red, 15.9% green, 1.4% yellow, 
and .7% black. In the no game condition, 86.2% played red, 13.8% 
green, 0% yellow, and 0% black. A Chi Square Test for Independence 
indicated that there was no significant difference in the pattern of 
responding between the game and the no game conditions (X' = .29; df 
= l; p > .OS). Because of the low numbers of black and yellow 
played, only the choices of red and green were analyzed across the 
two groups. 
Figure 4 illustrates the responses of the individuals in the 
fine and no fine conditions on the large referent group posttest. 
In the fine condition, 65.0% chose red, 8.0% green, 23.4% yellow, and 
3.6% black. In the no fine condition, 64.5% played red, 13.0% green, 
and 22.5% yellow. A Chi Square Test of Independence indicated that 
there were no significant differences in the pattern of choices for 
the fine and the no fine groups (X, = 1.47; df = 2; p > .05 ). Black 
as a category in the Chi Square analysis was eliminated because it 
was not available in the no fine group. 
Figure 2. The percentage of individuals who played red, green, yellow, 
or black on the large group posttest across the game-no game condition. 
(Numbers above bars are number of subjects.) 
100 
80 
I 103 
w 80 
0 
-0 
J: 
70 
0 
lL 80 
0 
w 60 
CJ 
~ 401 
-
53 CONDITION 
z ~ ~ GAME w 0 30 - NO GAME 
a: 
w 
0. 20 
10 
I V//: !-'///, V///: A 
1 
I I/// / r /,,,,,, V/// 0 > > > I 
0 
RED GREEN YELLOW BLACK 
CHOICES 
.i::,. 
0 
Figure 3. The percentage of individuals who played red, green, yellow, 
or black on the small group posttest across the game-no game condition. 
(Numbers above bars are number of subjects.) 
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Figure 4. The percentage of individuals who played red, green, yellow, 
or black on the large group posttest across the fine -no fine condition. 
(Numbers above bars are number of subjects.) 
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Figure 5. The percentage of individuals who played red, green, yellow, 
or black on the small group posttest across the fine-no fine condition. 
(Numbers above bars are number of subjects.) 
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Figure S shows the choices of the individuals in the fine and no 
fine group on the small referent group posttest. As may be seen, 
those in the fine condition were somewhat less likely to play red and 
more likely to play green than subjects in the no fine group. In the 
fine condition, 79.6% chose red, 18.2% green, 1.5% yellow, and . 7% 
black. In the no fine condition, 88.4% played red, 11.6% green, and 
0% played yellow. The results of a Chi Square Test for Independence 
showed that the observed differences in the choices of the 
individuals in the fine and the no fine condition on the small 
referent group posttest were not significant. (X 2 = 2.64; df = l; p 
> .OS). Black was eliminated from the analysis because one of the 
conditions did not have that choice available, and yellow was 
eliminated from the an~lysis because of the low number of individuals 
who made that choice. 
Figure 6 illustrates the results of the game-no game and the 
fine-no fine conditions using pre- posttest comparisons. Detailed 
breakdowns by number and per cent for the fine-no fine and the game-
no game conditions are shown in Tables 4 and S, respectively, in 
Appendix S. For each main condition, the three plots show the per 
cent of red, green, yellow, and black played given the subjects play 
in the pretest. For the game-no game condition, the subjects who 
played red in the pretest in the game group played 22.3% more yellow 
and 26.5% less red on the posttest than the subjects who played red 
on the pretest in the no game condition. These values were obtained 
by subtracting the per cent of red and yellow played on the small 
posttest from the large posttest. For example, subjects on the large 
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posttest in the game condition played 57.1% red and 33.8% yellow 
while subjects in the no game condition played 83.6% red and 11.5% 
yellow. The subjects who played green on the pretest in the game 
group played 28. 7% more yellow and 26.8% less red on the posttest 
than the subjects who pla yed green on the pretest in the no game 
group. The subjects who played yellow on the pretest in the game 
grou p played 45.9% more yellow and 36.6% less red on the posttest 
than the subjects who played yellow on the pretest in the no game 
group. In general, subjects in the game group played less red and 
much more yellow on the posttest than subjects in the no game group . 
For the fine-no fine condition, the subjects who played red on 
the pretest in the fine group played .8% more yellow and 6.4% less 
red on the posttest than subjects in the no fine group. Subjects who 
played green on the pretest in the fine group played 3.3% more yellow 
and 8.5% more red on the posttest than subjects who played green on 
the pretest in the no fine group. Subjects who played yellow on the 
pretest in the fine group played 9.4% more red and 15.8% less yellow 
on the posttest than subjects who played green on the pretest in the 
no fine group. In general, subjects showed no consistent pattern in 
their play of red or yellow as a function of being in the fine or no 
fine group. 
A Chi Square Test of Independence was performed across the game 
and no game conditions on the number of subjects that changed to 
yellow versus the number in all other categories. That is, in the 
game group, 41 subjects switched to yellow and 102 subjects either 
played the same as they did in the pretest or switched to red, 
green, or black. In the no game group, 10 subjects switched to 
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yellow and 117 subjects either did not change from the pretest or 
switched to red, green, or black. The results of a Chi Square Test 
for Independence showed that there was a significant difference in 
the pattern of responding between the ga me and the no game groups (X 2 
= 14.8; df = 1; p. < .01). 
A Chi Square Test for Independence was also performed across the 
fine-no fine condition on the number of subjects who switched to 
yel low versus all other categories. For the fine group, 24 switched 
to yellow and 101 made other choices. For the no fine group , 27 
switched to yellow and 118 made other choices. The results of a Chi 
Square Test for Independence indicated that there was no significant 
difference in the pattern of choices for the fine and no fine groups 
(X 2 = .02; df = l; p > .05). 
Figure 7 shows the results of the game versus no game condition 
within the fine and no fine groups . Detailed breakdowns by 
frequency and per cent for both the fine and the no fine condition 
are shown in Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix 5. For the two levels of 
the fine-no fine condition, the frequency and per cent of red, green, 
yellow and black on the posttest given subjects' pretest choices were 
plotted. For the fine group, subjects who played red on the pretest 
in the game group played 19.2% more yellow and 25.0% less red on the 
posttest than subjects who played green on the pretest in the no game 
group. Subjects who played green on the pretest in the game group 
played 36.6% more yellow and 31 .0 % less red on the posttest than 
subjects who played gree n in the pretest in the no game group . 
Subjects who played yellow on the pretest in the game group played 
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33.3% more yellow and 42.9% less red than subjects who played green 
in the pretest in the no game group. Within the no fine group, 
subjects who played red on the pretest in the game group played 25.4% 
more yellow and 27.6% less red on the posttest than subjects who 
played green on the pretest in the no game condition. Subjects who 
played green on the pretest in the game group played 24.7% more 
yellow and 24.0% less red than subjects who played green on the 
pretest in the no game group. Subjects who played yellow in the 
pretest in the game condition played 58.3% more yellow and 28.3% less 
red on the posttest than subjects who played green on the pretest in 
the no game condition. In general, the results substantiated the 
findings of the game-no game comparisons (left side of Figure 6), 
extending the results to show that the differences between the game 
and no game groups occurred within the fine and no fine groups. 
Figure 6. The percentage of posttest choices given pretest choice for 
the game-no game condition and fine-no fine condition. 
100 N 77 
75 
50 
25 
w o__.__-....1....<.-
u 
~ 100 
u 
u... 75 
0 
t5 50 
~ 
z 25 
w 
u 
N 42 
~ 0---L......--LL-
w 
a.. 
100 N 24 
75 
50 
25 
PRE-RED 
N 61 N 70 
PRE-GREEN 
N 43 N 30 
PRE-YELLOW 
N 23 N 25 
0 __.___~~..:.L-.L...1...c-
48 
N 68 
N 55 
N 25 
GAME NO GAME FINE NOFINE 
POSTTEST CHOICE 
C2! RED 
- GREEN 
CSI YELLOW 
D BLACK 
Figure 7. The percentage of posttest choices given pretest choice 
across the game-no game condition within the fine and no fine groups. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
More cooperation and less defection did not generalize from a 
commons simulation to a posttest that incorporated several real 
world features. However, the game did have one significant effect! 
In general, the results showed that subjects who played the commons 
game played the large group posttest differently than subjects who 
did not play the game. More specifically, subjects who participated 
in the commons dilemma simulation played many more withdrawal 
responses on the posttest when that posttest was played with a large 
unknown referent group. In addition, a descriptive pre- posttest 
analysis showed that mo·re yellow and less red were played in the game 
group than in the no game group and that this effect was consistent 
within the fine and the no fine conditions. A Chi Square analysis 
between the game and no game groups on subjects' pretest and posttest 
responses showed that subjects in the game condition switched to play 
more yellow (withdrawing at a greater frequency than subjects in the 
no game group). While there were no differences in the play of the 
game and no game subjects on the small group posttest, there were 
large visible differences in how the game group played the small and 
the large posttest. Specifically, subjects on the large posttest 
cooperated less and withdrew from the game more than on the small 
posttests. 
In contrast to the game ve rsus no game results, there were no 
differences in the play of the fine and no fine groups on either the 
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large or the small group generalization posttest. A descriptive pre-
posttest analysis showed that no differences existed in the play of 
these groups. A Chi Square analysis also showed no significant 
effect when the change to yellow versus all other possible choices 
was analyzed. 
The result that game subjects played the large and small group 
posttests differently was not surprising. During the simulation, 
groups typically struggled with the problem of trusting and 
cooperating with one another. Subjects often made agreements with 
each other and broke those agreements after several trials during the 
first half of the simulation. In addition, the state of the resource 
diminished as a consequence of green play. One might expect that 
when experienced subjects played with a large unknown referent group 
that they would be more cautious about the play of unknown people. 
Reference to the difficulty of trusting unknown players was 
frequently made by the game subjects when they conferenced prior to 
the marking of the large posttest. Also, prior to marking the small 
posttest, subjects frequently indicated that they should be able to 
trust each other and they sought commitments from each other prior to 
marking the posttest. 
That subjects in the game condition withdrew more frequently 
from the commons posttest is a result that is different from the data 
that has come directly from other research (Dawes, 1980). The gaming 
research has suggested that experience in a commons simulation that 
allows communication leads to more cooperation and less defection. 
One major reason for this difference may be that many games only 
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allow subjects to make polar choices, that is, to defect or to 
cooperate, to take points or not to take points. The results of this 
study suggest that researchers may need to consider the impact of 
other choices on the behavior of individuals in a commons. In the 
present study, yellow was an additional choice that allowed subjects 
to withdraw from play for a low salary. The frequent use of this 
choice by subjects in the game condition on the play of the large 
posttest suggests that the commons experience has made players 
cautious or distrustful of other players. Evidence for this was the 
Chi Square analysis of the yellow play which showed that a 
significant number of subjects in the game condition switched to 
yellow on the posttest from red or green on the pretest. Other 
anecdotal evidence for this conclusion was obtained from the play of 
subjects during the commons simulation and the conferences held prior 
to the play of the posttests. Typically, during the game, defection 
occurred many times, lowering the value of the resource, so that 
subjects earned more points playing yellow or green. If a subject 
acted only for immediate individual profit, he/she would choose to 
play green (defection) consequently exploiting the other players and 
bringing about the demise of the commons. The player could choose 
yellow (withdrawal) if he/she didn't want to harm others and did not 
trust other players completely. During conferences subjects usually 
agreed to play all yellow or all red and one orange and further 
agreed that no one should play green. Frequently, several defections 
still occurred angering and frustrating some players as evidenced by 
loud sighs and complaints when the count was presented by the game 
manager. During the conference prior to the large posttest, some 
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subjects discussed the simulation experience and indicated that other 
players (in the immediate simulation group or in the larger group 
they were playing with) could not be trusted, indicating that at 
least four people would try to "cheat" and resulting in the fact that 
cooperators would earn less than withdrawers. This suggests that 
players withdrew to protect themselves from being exploited by green 
(exploitative) players. 
Because subjects in the treatment and no treatment groups played 
the small posttest similarly further implicated the role of caution 
when subjects played the large posttest in an unknown group. In the 
conference prior to the marking of the small group posttest, subjects 
indicated the value of all playing red, that more than half of the 
seven member group must play green to receive low points for 
cooperation, and that subjects should therefore commit themselves to 
play red verbally. Subjects also appeared more willing to trust 
players that they could communicate with and could see. Thus, it 
seemed that playing the posttest only with members of their immediate 
face-to-face group elicited more communication and trust because of 
the groups' apparent ability to control its own outcome with much 
less risk to itself. 
The results of the fine and no fine groups suggest that the 
effects of fines in these simulations did not generalize. This 
finding, however, is contrary to the findings of Powers and Boyle 
(1983) which found that the fine option did generalize to a posttest 
similar to the one used here. One explanation for this result may be 
that the fines themselves were ineffective because the user would 
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have had to give up the opportunity to earn a large number of points 
(a subject choosing black forfeits the chance to earn 14 class points 
in a cooperative group). Alternatively, the fines may have been 
ineffective because no one thought they would be used. 
The importance of being able to show that generalization from a 
commons simulation will occur cannot be overstressed. If this 
research is to have some ultimate utility, it must be shown that 
experiences learned in the commons simulation will be useful in 
helping to solve real world commons problems. Further, it must be 
shown that variables effective in the simulation environment will 
also be effective in the real world. If this can be shown, then we 
can use empirically verifiable criteria for making policy decisions 
about the best course of action to eliminate resource destruction and 
produce effective resource management in the real world. 
Before closing, several points about the present research should 
be addressed. It could be argued that the dependent measures used in 
this study were relatively weak measures of generalization, that they 
were too similar to the simulation. While this may be true, there 
are several features about the post tests that were important. 1) 
The posttests were one trial, that is subjects did not have an 
opportunity to correct their play based upon feedback from the other 
members' play. 2) The individuals played for a large number of 
points. The points the subjects could earn on one trial were often 
more than they could earn by playing the entire game. 3) For the 
large posttest, the subjects played with many players whose 
identities were unknown. This latter attribute alone simulates a 
very real aspect of the world, i.e., that there are many unknown 
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people using the same resource. 
One way the effectiveness and validity of this research might be 
improved is by using a posttest in which individuals play for money, 
a very generalized reinforcer. The advantage of using money would be 
that the resource is different from class points for grades, giving 
more credibility to the notion that generalization has occurred. 
Another advantage is that money is such a generalized reinforcer that 
it would definitely motivate subjects to defect. Consequently, 
generalization in the posttest in groups playing the game would have 
much more validity than in the present research which used class 
points in the game and the posttests. 
In summary, the results of the present study support the 
conclusion that subjects change from exposure to a commons 
simulation, specifically, that subjects obtain, perhaps, a more 
realistic view of the real world. 
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Appendix I 
Payoff matrices for the 
Commons Dilemma Game 
62 
The present appendix contains the 17 payoff matrices for the 
Commons Dilemma Game. The matrices are ordered from worst (-8) to 
best (+8). Within each matrix, there are three column headings: N of 
R (number of red), R (red), G (green). To find the payoffs for red 
and green for a given trial and matrix, count the number of red 
played by the group and find that number in the N of R column. Then, 
find the payoff for red and green in the columns under Rand G, 
respectively, and on the same row as the actual number of red played. 
-8 -7 -6 
N of R R G N of R R G N of R R G 
0 0 0 2 0 4 
1-2 -10 2 1-2 -9 4 1-2 -8 6 
3 
- 8 4 3 - 7 6 3 - 6 8 
4 
- 6 6 4 - 5 8 4 - 4 10 
5 
- 4 8 5 - 3 10 5 - 2 12 
6 
- 2 10 6 - 1 12 6 0 14 
7 0 7 1 7 2 
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-5 -4 -3 
N of R R G N of R R G N of R R G 
0 6 0 14 0 26 
1-2 
- 7 8 1-2 - 3 16 1-2 3 28 
3 
- 5 10 3 - 1 18 3 5 30 
4 
- 3 12 4 1 20 4 7 32 
5 
- 1 14 5 3 22 5 9 34 
6 1 16 6 5 24 6 11 36 
7 3 7 7 7 13 
-2 -1 0 
N of R R G N of R R G N of R R G 
0 46 0 70 0 100 
1-2 13 48 1-2 25 72 1-2 40 102 
3 15 so 3 27 74 3 42 104 
4 17 52 4 29 76 4 44 106 
5 19 54 5 31 78 5 46 108 
6 21 56 6 33 80 6 48 110 
7 23 7 35 7 so 
1 2 3 
N of R R G N of R R G N of R R G 
0 130 0 154 0 174 
1-2 55 132 1-2 67 156 1-2 77 176 
3 57 134 3 69 158 3 79 178 
4 59 136 4 71 160 4 81 180 
5 61 138 5 73 162 5 83 182 
6 63 140 6 75 164 6 85 184 
7 65 7 77 7 87 
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4 5 6 
N of R R G N of R R G N of R R G 
0 180 0 194 0 196 
1-2 83 188 1-2 87 196 1-2 88 198 
3 85 190 3 89 198 3 90 200 
4 87 192 4 91 200 4 92 202 
5 89 194 5 93 202 5 94 204 
6 91 196 6 95 204 6 96 206 
7 93 7 97 7 98 
7 8 
N of R R G N of R R G 
0 198 0 200 
1-2 89 200 1-2 90 202 
3 91 202 3 92 204 
4 93 204 4 94 206 
5 95 206 5 96 208 
6 97 208 6 98 210 
7 99 7 100 212 
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Appendix II 
Pegboard for the Commons 
Dilemma Game 
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Every 10 holes from the starting point effects a change in the 
matrix. The numbers in the top right hand corner of each bi n 
ind'i.cate the particular matrix associated with that bin. 
+1 +3 +5 +7 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
.0 .+2 +4 +6 +8 
• • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
STA RT .. • 
• 0 - 2 -4 -6 - 8 
• • • • 
• 
,.
• • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
-1 -3 -5 - 7 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
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Appendix III 
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The following two pages contain two samples of the posttests 
used to assess generalization. The first posttest is an example 
containing the fine option; the second posttest is and example in 
which the fine option is absent. 
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MALE ___________ _ NAME __________ _ 
FEMALE DATE ___________ _ 
PROCTOR __________ _ 
Commons Game (1 trial only) 
The game described below is a one-trial only game that you play with 
others who have the same experience as you in this game. Thus, if 
you have played once, you will be playing with only those who have 
played once. If you 've played twice, you will be playing with those 
who have played twice, etc. The points listed in the matrix are 
class points and will be added to your total which counts towards 
your grade. When you have made your choice and filled in the 
information required, fold the paper in half and give it to Dr. 
Powers. 
Thank you. 
Play Pay 
(Class Points) 
(Number of) 
Red Green Red Green 
All Red (N) 0 12 
All Red but 1 (N-1) 1 10 20 
All Red but 2 (N-2) 2 8 16 
All Red but 3 (N-3) 3 6 12 
Any other combination earns 1 point for red; 2 points for green 
Black= earns nothing but fines any green 3 points 
Yellow= earns 3 points regardless of what anyone else does 
Check one: 
Red Green Yellow 
I have played this game: 
Check one: 
Never Once Twice 3 Times More 
Black 
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MALE ___________ _ NAME ___________ _ 
FEMALE 
-------------
DATE __________ _ 
PROCTOR __________ _ 
Commons Game (1 trial only) 
The game described below is a one-trial only game that you play with 
others who have the same experience as you in this game. Thus, if 
you have played once, you will be playing with only those who have 
played once. If you've played twice, you will be playing with those 
who have played twice, etc. The points listed in the matrix are 
class points and will be added to your total which counts towards 
your grade. When you have made your choice and filled in the 
information required, fold the paper in half and give it to Dr. 
Powers. 
Thank you. 
Play Pay 
(Class Points) 
(Number of) 
Red Green Red Green 
All Red (N) 0 12 
All Red but 1 (N-1) 1 10 20 
All Red but 2 (N-2) 2 8 16 
All Red but 3 (N-3) 3 6 12 
Any other combination earns 1 point for red; 2 points for green 
Yellow= earns 3 points regardless of what anyone else does 
Check one: 
Red Green Yellow 
I have played this game: 
Check one: 
Never Once Twice 3 Times More 
71 
Appendix IV 
Standardized instructions for the 
Commons Dilemma Game 
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Today, you are going to play the Commons Dilemma Game and you 
will have an opportunity to each earn some class points for extra 
credit. To begin with, you should know and remember that 100 game 
points equals one of your class points. 
In front of each of you should be a record sheet, a shield, and 
five differently colored cards: red, green, yellow, orange, and 
black. In a few minutes you are going to play the commons game. The 
game is played for 50 to 100 trials and on each trial I will ask you 
to play a card. And, it is by playing cards that each of you will 
earn points. Let's talk about how you earn points using the cards. 
The first two cards we will talk about are the red and the green 
cards. The payoff or the number of game points you will earn on a 
given trial for a play of red or green is determined by the payoff 
matrix (the game manager points to the flipchart at the front of the 
room). Specifically, the number of red cards that is played by the 
group on a given trial determines the number of points that red and 
green earn for that trial. To read the matrix, find the number of 
red played by the group in the "number of red played" column on the 
matrix (the game manager traces through this procedure while 
explaining). Then, read across the row. The first number, under the 
red column, is what red earns; the second number, under the green 
column, is what green earns for that trial. Let's take an example 
using the zero matrix. Suppose the group plays 4 red cards and 3 
green cards. The individuals who played red would earn 44 points and 
the individuals who played green would earn 106 points. (Again, the 
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game manager traces through the matrix.) O.K., let's take another 
example. How many points would each red and green player earn if 2 
red cards and 5 green cards were played? (The game manager will pick 
one of the subjects to answer and will agree or disagree with the 
response. If the answer given is incorrect the game manager will 
explain the how the values for red and green plays were reached.) 
Are there any questions? (The game manager will answer any questions 
paraphrasing the instructions given above or deferring any questions 
that will be answered later.) 
Before you there is also a yellow card. If you play the yellow 
card on a given trial, it will give you 6 points. That is, you will 
earn 6 points regardless of what the other players in the group do on 
that trial. 
Black is another card before you that you may play on any 
trial. Now, black costs you 10 points to play and negates any pay 
for green as well as imposing a 20 point loss on those playing green. 
Specifically, if a black is played, any one who plays green on that 
trial will lose 20 points and the person who plays black will lose 10 
points. Remember, black costs 10 points to play but it fines all 
green pla yers 20 points. 
The final card available for play is the orange card. Like 
black, orange also costs 10 points to play but it gives all red 
players 10 additional points. That is, if orange is played on a 
trial and you play red, you will earn the value on the matrix that 
red earns plus 10 more points. Orange will lose 10 points. 
Now let's have another example. Suppose 1 red, 3 green, 1 
yellow, 1 orange, and 1 black are played. Well, red would earn 50 
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points--40 for red and 10 because someone played orange; green would 
lose 20 points--because someone played a black green does not earn 
what it would have otherwise, 102 points. Yellow would earn 6 points 
and orange and black would each lose 10 points . 
Are there any questions about the values of cards and how they 
work? (The game manager will only ask questions about what has gone 
before. Any questions about why someone would play some of the cards 
was responded to by indicating that an important part of the game is 
for the group to discover its own stategies.) 
In front of the room you will note that there is a pegboard next 
to the flipchart matrix (the manager will point). For each green 
that is played by the group, the peg on the pegboard will move down 
one hole. When the peg moves down 10 holes and into the next bin, 
which is separated by the dark heavy red or green lines, the matrix 
will get worse. That is, for each 10 holes that the peg moves down, 
the matrix will get worse. Every so often, at a predetermined and 
random time, the peg will move up a predetermined number of holes. 
There is nothing that you can directly do to move the peg upwards. 
If the peg moves up and into the next bin, the matrix will change and 
it will be for the better. In summary, the only play that makes 
things worse is green; if any other card is played it will not affect 
the matrix for better or for worse. Are there any questions? (Only 
questions relating to what has been discussed will be answered.) 
Now there are only a couple of more things to be discussed. The 
commons dilemma game lasts approximately 100 trials, that is the 
group members will be asked to play a card about 100 times. Now 
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remember that in front of you is your player record sheet. When the 
game manager states what trial it is and asks you to play, you are to 
record what color you intend to play before you play it. That is, 
after you have recorded your play, point to the color you have 
recorded. Then, the game manager will walk around the table and 
record the play of the group. When the game manager has tallied the 
play of the group, he will announce the number of each card played 
and the number of points each colored card earned. Record the number 
of points you earned or lost on that trial. Also, you are to use the 
shields in front of you to conceal your play from the others you are 
playing with. 
Finally, I would like to give you an analogy that may help you 
play this game. (The game manager will read this analogy word for 
word from a card.) 
It will be useful in the understanding of 
this game to look at points as a resource 
somewhat akin to the whales or fish in the 
ocean. If you try to get as many fish as 
possible each time you harvest, you will quickly 
deplete the resource--you will take the fish 
faster than they can reproduce and replace what 
you have harvested. If, however, you harvest at 
a moderate rate, the fish will be able to 
reproduce at a rate greater than or equal to the 
demand and the resource will last indefinitely. 
In summary, points,like the fish, reproduce 
every so often and if you are moderate in your 
take, the point resource should be rich and last 
the life of the game. 
You are now ready to play the game and this is how each trial 
will work. I will announce the the trial, the trial number, and ask 
you to play. At this time, I want you to write in the color of the 
card you intend to play next to the trial number I announce. Then 
point to the card. Use the shields that have been provided to 
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conceal your choices from the other players in the room. I will then 
walk around the room and tally what the group has played as a whole 
and then announce how many of each color was played. Finally, I will 
announce how many points each color earned or lost. Write in your 
record sheet next to the color you wrote, how many points you earned 
on that trial. Then we will move on to the next trial. 
Now, until the game manager indicates differently, you are not 
to communicate with the other members of your group. Are you ready? 
Let's have a practice trial. Don't record what you are going to play 
or what the game manager announces as point values. O.K., Practice 
Trial, play. (Game manager walks around the room, records the group 
play, and announces the points each color would have earned if it had 
been a game trail.) 
Are there any questions? (Game manager fields all questions 
relevant to the stated rules clarifying by paraphrasin g the 
instructions.) 
Standardized instructions for 
the generalization test 
Fill in the information requested at the top of this sheet. At 
the bottom of the sheet in front of you is written: "I have played 
this game:" and "Check one:". Put an X in the box under "once". 
Now, before you fill in one of the choices that will be required 
of you, there are some further instructions. I would like you all to 
understand who you are playing this game with. You are playing with 
all the people who have the same form, and the same gaming 
experience as you, past, present, and future. 
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No game-no fine. That is, you are playing with all the people 
this quarter who will or have come in here, sit down, and fill out 
this game sheet choosing either the red, the green and yellow 
choices. All the groups with your experience have had 10 minutes to 
discuss the chioces that they might make. 
No game-fine. That is, you are playing with all the people this 
quarter who have or will come in here, sit down and fill out this 
game sheet, choosing either the red, the green, the yellow, or the 
black choice. In addition, all the groups with your experience will 
have had 10 minutes to discuss the choices that they might make. 
Game no-fine. That is, you are playing with all the people this 
quarter who have or will come in here, sit down at this table, play 
the Commons Dilemma Game, and fill out this form, choosing either the 
red, the green, or the yellow choice. In addition, all the groups 
with your experience have had 10 minutes to discuss the choices that 
you might make. 
Game-fine. That is, you are playing with all the people this 
quarter who have or will come in here; sit down at this table; play 
the Commons Dilemma Game; and fill out this form, choosing either the 
red, the green, the yellow, or the black choice. In addition, all 
the groups with your experience have had 10 minutes to discuss the 
choices that they might make. 
Are there any questions about who you are playing with? (Game 
manager fields questions and makes sure the subjects understand who 
they are playing the form with. At this time subjects were also 
informed that the given group is in one of four conditions in an 
experiment and that they will be playing with approximately three or 
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four other groups in the same condition.) 
Now, before you make one of the choices, let me restate some of 
what is written on the sheet. If all of you play red, you will all 
earn 12 class points. However, if all of you play red and one 
person plays green, the red will earn 10 class points and the green 
will earn 20 class points. If all but two of you play red and those 
two both play green, then the reds will earn 8 class points and the 
green will earn 16 class points. If four or more people play green, 
persons who play red will earn one class point and the people who 
played green will earn two class points. 
Also available as a choice is yellow. Yellow will give you 
three class points no matter what anyone else does. If you play 
yellow you will automatically earn 3 class points. 
Fine option. The last choice available is black. It costs you 
nothing to play and it fines every player of green 3 class points. 
If you like you may have up to 10 minutes to discuss among 
yourselves what you would like to do. When each of you have decided 
for yourself, mark one of the choices in private, and fold the sheet 
in half. 
Standardized instructions for 
the small group posttest 
This form is exactly like the other one you just completed 
except that you will only be playing with the seven people in this 
room. Again, you may have up to 10 minutes to discuss what you would 
like to do before you make your choice. When you have decided, mark 
one of the choices and fold your sheet in half. 
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(After the subjects have all made one of the choices on the 
small group posttest, they were informed of the results of the group 
on that posttest and told that the experiment was over.) 
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Appendix V 
Table 4 
Posttest Choices Given Pretest Choices for the Game-No Game 
Condition 
Posttest 
Choices 
Red 
Green 
Yellow 
Black 
Totals 
Condition 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Both 
Red 
f 
44 
51 
6 
3 
26 
7 
1 
0 
77 
61 
138 
p 
57.1 
83.6 
7.8 
4.9 
33.8 
11.5 
1.3 
0.0 
Choice on Pretest 
Green 
f 
20 
32 
6 
8 
15 
3 
1 
0 
42 
43 
85 
p 
47.6 
74.4 
14.3 
18.6 
35.7 
7.0 
2.4 
0.0 
Yellow 
f p 
10 41. 7 
18 
1 
4 
11 
0 
2 
1 
24 
23 
47 
78.3 
4.2 
17.4 
45.8 
0.0 
8.3 
4.4 
81 
Row 
Totals 
74 
101 
13 
15 
52 
10 
4 
1 
143 
127 
270 
Note. The letters 'f' and 'p' indicate the frequency and per cent of 
posttest choices given a pretest choice. 
Table 5 
Posttest Choices Given Pretest Choices for Fine-No Fine 
Condition 
Choice on Pretest 
Red Green Yellow 
Posttest 
Choices 
Red 
Green 
Yellow 
Black 
Totals 
Condition 
Fine 
No fine 
Fine 
No fine 
Fine 
No fine 
Fine 
No fine 
Fine 
No fine 
Both 
f 
46 
49 
6 · 
3 
17 
16 
1 
~-
70 
68 
138 
p 
65.7 
72.1 
8.6 
4.4 
24.3 
23.5 
1.4 
f 
20 
32 
2 
12 
7 
11 
1 
* 
30 
55 
85 
p 
66.7 
58.2 
6.7 
21.8 
23.3 
20 .0 
3.3 
f 
16 
12 
2 
3 
4 
7 
3 
~-
25 
22 
47 
p 
64.0 
54.6 
18.0 
13.6 
16.0 
31.8 
12.0 
82 
Row 
Totals 
82 
93 
10 
18 
28 
34 
5 
~-
125 
145 
270 
Note. The letters 'f' and 'p' indicate the frequency and per cent of 
posttest choices given a pretest choice. Asterisks '*' indicate that 
this option was not available. 
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Table 6 
Posttest Choices Given Pretest Choices across the Game-No Game 
Condition within the Fine Group 
Posttest 
Choices 
Red 
Green 
Yellow 
Black 
Totals 
Condition 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Both 
f 
22 
24 
4 
2 
13 
4 
1 
0 
40 
30 
70 
Red 
p 
55.0 
80.0 
10.0 
6.7 
32.5 
13.3 
2.5 
0.0 
Choice on Pretest 
f 
7 
13 
0 
2 
6 
1 
1 
0 
14 
16 
30 
Green 
p 
50.0 
81.3 
0.0 
12.5 
42.9 
6.3 
7.1 
0.0 
f 
5 
11 
1 
1 
4 
0 
2 
1 
12 
13 
25 
Yellow 
p 
41. 7 
84.6 
8.3 
7.7 
33.3 
0.0 
16.7 
7.7 
Row 
Totals 
34 
48 
5 
5 
23 
5 
4 
1 
66 
59 
125 
Note. The letters 'f' and 'p' indicate the frequency and per cent of 
posttest choices given a pretest choice. 
Table 7 
Posttest Choices Given Pretest Choices for the Game-No Game 
Condition within the No Fine Group 
Posttest 
Choices 
Red 
Green 
Yellow 
Black 
Totals 
Condition 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Game 
No game 
Both 
f 
22 
27 
2 
1 
13 
3 
~~ 
~--
37 
31 
68 
Red 
p 
59.5 
87.1 
5.4 
3.2 
35.1 
9.7 
Choice on Pretest 
f 
13 
19 
6 
6 
9 
2 
~~ 
~-
28 
27 
55 
Green 
p 
46.4 
70.4 
21.4 
22.2 
32.1 
7.4 
f 
5 
7 
0 
3 
7 
0 
;°i-
~} 
12 
10 
22 
Yellow 
p 
41. 7 
70.0 
0.0 
30.0 
58.3 
0.0 
84 
Row 
Totals 
40 
53 
8 
10 
29 
5 
~-
.. ~-
77 
68 
145 
Note. The letters 'f' and 'p' indicate the frequency and per cent of 
posttest choices given a pretest choice. Asterisks '*' indicate that 
this option is not available. 
